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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-3225
PHILIP H. REARDON,
Appellant
v.
ROY L. HENDRICKS,* Administrator;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(Dist. Court No. 98-cv-04711)
District Court Judge: Hon. Katharine S. Hayden
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 15, 2003
Before: ALITO, AMBRO, and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: November 13, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT
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ALITO, Circuit Judge:
Phillip Reardon appeals a District Court order denying his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.  Reardon argues that his state conviction for aggravated manslaughter is
unconstitutional because his confession was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights.  We affirm.
I.
In 1991, Reardon underwent treatment for alcoholism at a detoxification center in
Red Bank, New Jersey.  Doctors considered him a “maintenance drinker,” meaning that
he would experience serious withdrawal symptoms such as nausea and muscle spasms if
he did not consume a high volume of alcohol on a daily basis.  On July 15, 1991, Reardon
quit his treatment program and stole a pair of surgical gloves from the center.  He also
stole a bottle of vodka and a roll of duct tape from local merchants.
In the parking lot of the Foodtown grocery market in Red Bank, Reardon followed
79-year-old Kathleen Dalton to her car, a green 1978 Oldsmobile.  Wearing the surgical
gloves to hide his fingerprints, he pushed Dalton into the passenger seat, ordered her to
duck from view, and drove the car away.  To quiet his victim, Reardon placed duct tape
over Dalton’s mouth and nose, and she died from asphyxiation.  He disposed of her body
in a remote location, stealing her wallet, wristwatch, and diamond ring, partially severing
her ring finger in the process.
Reardon pawned Dalton’s ring for $375 at an antique shop in Shrewsbury, New
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Jersey, and the store’s owner, James Heayn, recorded Reardon’s driver’s license.  The
next day, Reardon drove Dalton’s car to New York, where he obtained a false
identification card bearing the name John Dalton, purchased more liquor, and attempted
unsuccessfully to use Dalton’s credit card to obtain money from a check-cashing outlet. 
Parking authorities ticketed Dalton’s car outside the store.  Reardon then attempted to
purchase a gold chain from a jewelry shop with Dalton’s credit card, but the sales clerk
noticed her name on the card and was instructed by the credit-card issuer to cut it up. 
Reardon returned to New Jersey.  Police located Dalton’s car outside Captain Kern’s Bar
in Belmar on July 19.
When Reardon left the bar and began to drive the car away, police stopped him
and arrested him.  Detective Michael Cerame read Reardon his Miranda rights, and
Reardon agreed to make a statement.  In the version of events in this first confession,
Reardon admitted stealing Dalton’s car but denied having any knowledge about her
disappearance.  He claimed that the car was empty when he found it with the keys in the
ignition and Dalton’s pocketbook on the front seat.  The police were not satisfied with
Reardon’s account and attempted further interrogation.  When Detective Michael
Dowling confronted Reardon with the reasons for their suspicion, Reardon asked: “If I
tell you the truth, can I have a drink?”  Dowling agreed.  When Reardon asked how he
could be sure that Dowling was telling the truth, Reardon displayed a bottle of gin. 
Dowling then related the complete circumstances of the crime and Dalton’s death.  The
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police asked numerous followup questions, and Reardon answered them.  Later, Reardon
led the police to Dalton’s body.
Reardon was indicted, and he moved to suppress his confession.  After conducting
a four-day hearing, the Superior Court denied the motion and found that the state had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession had been voluntary.  The Court
found that Reardon had been given and had waived his Miranda rights six times.  The
Court also noted the testimony that, during the time in question, Reardon had been “calm, 
very cooperative, and not nervous or tense” and that he had not exhibited signs that he
was “not able to function without alcohol.”  The Court observed that “[t]he details, the
language that was used, the preciseness with which the . . . statement was given” showed
that Reardon knew what he was saying.   The Court concluded:
[T]his Court is satisfied that there is no reasonable doubt
about the voluntariness of [the] confession.  I am satisfied that
Mr. Reardon confessed to Marjorie Dalton’s murder out of an
overwhelming sense of guilt and a realization that at that time
it was inevitable, that he was going to be discovered as a
culprit. 
Reardon was convicted of aggravated manslaughter and other offenses and was
sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment.  The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Supreme
Court of New Jersey denied certification.  See State v. Reardon, 704 A.2d 19 (N.J. 1997).
Without condoning the conduct of the interrogators in offering to accede to Reardon’s
request for alcohol, the Appellate Division stated:
[W]hen we review all of the circumstances, we conclude that
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there is no objective evidence that defendant’s will was
overborne.  Rather, he gave a coherent, well-organized and
sequential statement of his actions.  To be sure, the record
reveals that defendant’s hands were trembling.  However, the
interrogators and both experts acknowledged that many
persons in defendant’s situation exhibit far greater signs of
anxiety than demonstrated by defendant before and during his
second statement.  His tears are also consistent with the
remorse he experienced when he realized that he had killed
Dalton.  In short, defendant’s conduct does not support his
contention that his anxiety of imminent alcohol withdrawal
dominated his thoughts and reasoning. 
Reardon then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in District Court, arguing,
inter alia, that his second confession was involuntary and should have been excluded. 
The District Court denied the writ but ordered the issuance of a certificate of appealability
on that issue.  See Reardon v. Hendricks, No. 98-4711 (D. N.J. July 31, 2002).  Relying
primarily on Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), a case in which the Supreme Court
found a conviction to be voluntary even though police had obtained it by promising to
release the suspect’s father from jail and not to prosecute his brother, the District Court
held that Reardon “understood what he was doing when he gave the statement and further
understood that he was not obligated to do so.”  Reardon, No. 98-4711, slip op. at 18.
II.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides that a writ
of habeas corpus shall not issue to a state prisoner unless the state court’s adjudication of
the relevant claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
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Supreme Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  A decision is “contrary
to” a Supreme Court holding if the state court “contradicts the governing law set forth in
[the Supreme Court’s] cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of th[e Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a
[different] result.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000).  A decision
“involve[s] an unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if the state
court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from th[e Supreme] Court’s cases but
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or if it “unreasonably
extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it
should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where
it should apply.”  Id. at 407.  
III.
Reardon argues that his second confession was coerced and involuntary and was
thus obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.  “The constitutional test for
voluntariness involves a determination, on the totality of the circumstances, whether the
confession was . . . the product of interrogation which resulted in the overbearing of the
defendant’s will.”  Miller v. Fenton, 741 F.2d 1456, 1465–66 (3d Cir. 1984).  A court
must take into account “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation,” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1991).  In determining the
voluntariness of confessions, 
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[s]ome of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the
accused . . . ; his lack of education . . . or his low intelligence . . . ; the lack
of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights . . . ; the length of
detention . . . ; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning . . . ;
and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.
. . .
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
In the present case, it is clear that the state courts applied this standard.  Moreover,
Reardon has not cited, and our research has not disclosed, any Supreme Court decision
holding on materially indistinguishable facts that a confession was involuntary. 
Accordingly, the adjudication of Reardon’s claim in the state courts is not “contrary to”
Supreme Court precedent.
The state courts’ application of the voluntariness standard to the facts of this
particular case was also reasonable.  The state courts’ analysis was thorough and attentive
to the relevant evidence and the factors bearing on voluntariness.  
Reardon stresses the effect of his alcohol dependency.  But although chemical
dependency can obviously serve as a powerful inducement and is an important factor to
be considered in determining whether a confession was voluntary, clearly established law
forecloses us from assigning controlling weight to Reardon’s alcoholism.  “The
significant fact about all of [the cases applying the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test] is
that none of them turned on the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion.” 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. 
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We have considered all of Reardon’s arguments but find no basis for reversal.  
IV.
For the reasons explained above, the order of the District Court denying the
application for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
                                                          
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
Kindly file the foregoing Not Precedential Opinion.
/s/ Samuel A. Alito, Jr.                           
Circuit Judge
